aegis · v0.12.0
Adaptive Engagement & Generic Inspection Scanner
An autonomous, AI-orchestrated web penetration testing agent. Aegis handles reconnaissance, fingerprinting, vulnerability discovery, verification, and reporting so the human pentester focuses on what actually requires human judgment.
What it is
Aegis runs structured, methodology-driven engagements against web targets. It profiles the host environment, fingerprints the target stack, selects relevant tools and tests from the PTES + OWASP WSTG v4.2 playbook, executes them concurrently, and produces a verified findings report with remediation guidance.
It is not a Burp Suite replacement. It is the autonomous recon and vuln-discovery layer that feeds the human pentester, eliminating roughly 70% of routine busywork.
Hard constraints built into the runtime:
- Every engagement requires a signed
scope.yamlbefore any network egress. - Every outbound request is matched against in-scope and out-of-scope rules before the socket opens.
- Scope violations abort the current task and are written to the audit log.
- Destructive tools (
sqlmap,wpscan,commix,kerbrute,crackmapexec, …) refuse to run without operator approval unlessscope.yamlexplicitly enables them. - There is no
--forceflag that bypasses scope.
Installation
Option A — Docker (recommended, all tools pre-installed)
# Pull pre-built image (~4 GB) or build locally (~15-30 min)
aegis docker pull # from GitHub Container Registry
# OR
aegis docker build # build locally from Dockerfile
# Run an engagement
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
aegis docker run engagements/2026-acme
# Interactive shell with every tool on PATH
aegis docker shell
# Check image status and tool inventory
aegis docker status
The Docker image is based on Kali rolling and includes every tool in the catalog.
Option B — PyPI
pip install aegis-pentest
# or
pipx install aegis-pentest
Option C — Arch (AUR)
yay -S aegis-pentest
# or
paru -S aegis-pentest
Optdepends cover the full tool surface; install only what you need.
Option D — Native install script (one-liner)
# Auto-detects Arch, Kali, Ubuntu/Debian, Fedora, macOS
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/glorybnat/aegis-pentest/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
# Or from the repo
bash scripts/install.sh
# Build Docker image instead
bash scripts/install.sh --docker
Option E — From source
git clone https://github.com/glorybnat/aegis-pentest.git
cd aegis-pentest
pip install -e .
cd tui && npm install && npm run build
After installing AEGIS, detect what's already on the host and fill in the rest:
aegis init # detect what's installed
aegis env tools --missing # show what's missing + install commands
aegis env install --missing # install everything (no-sudo tools)
aegis env install --missing --dry-run # preview first
Requirements:
- Python 3.12+
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYin environment- Docker (Option A) or pentest toolchain (Option B–E)
Quickstart
# Docker quickstart (zero host setup)
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
aegis docker build # or: aegis docker pull
aegis docker run engagements/2026-acme
# Native quickstart
# First run: profiles host, lists missing tools
aegis init
# Sync the knowledge base (NVD, GHSA, nuclei-templates, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS)
aegis kb sync
# Create a new engagement
aegis engagement new --client "Acme Corp" --domain "acme.com"
# Fill in the authorization details
vim engagements/2026-05-acme/scope.yaml
# Optional: seed endpoints from an existing API spec or proxy trace
aegis ingest openapi engagements/2026-05-acme/spec.yaml --engagement engagements/2026-05-acme
aegis ingest postman engagements/2026-05-acme/collection.json --engagement engagements/2026-05-acme
aegis ingest har engagements/2026-05-acme/burp.har --engagement engagements/2026-05-acme
# Run
aegis run engagements/2026-05-acme
# Resume from the last completed phase after a crash or Ctrl+C
aegis run engagements/2026-05-acme # picks up state.json automatically
# Generate report — md/html/json/sarif/h1/bugcrowd, or "all"
aegis report engagements/2026-05-acme --format html
aegis report engagements/2026-05-acme --format sarif # GitHub/GitLab code scanning
aegis report engagements/2026-05-acme --format h1 # HackerOne JSON, one per finding
aegis report engagements/2026-05-acme --format bugcrowd # Bugcrowd VRT bundle
scope.yaml
Aegis refuses to run without this file. No exceptions.
engagement_id: "BL-2026-007"
client: "Acme Corp"
operator: "Majd Bnat <[email protected]>"
authorization:
document_ref: "SOW-2026-007.pdf"
signed_date: "2026-05-12"
expiry: "2026-06-12"
in_scope:
domains:
- "*.acme.com"
- "api-staging.acme.io"
ips:
- "203.0.113.0/24"
out_of_scope:
- "admin.acme.com"
- "*.internal.acme.com"
rules_of_engagement:
rate_limit_rps: 10
business_hours_only: false
destructive_tests: false
no_credential_stuffing: true
no_dos_tests: true
confirm_before: # per-engagement gate for destructive tools
- sqlmap
- hydra
- commix
Architecture
aegis CLI
|
Engagement Manager
(scope validation, lifecycle, audit log)
|
+-----------------+-----------------+
| | |
Environment Target Methodology
Profiler Profiler Engine
(host info) (fingerprint) (PTES phases)
| | |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
|
LLM Orchestrator
(Haiku / Sonnet / Opus)
|
+----------+---------+----------+----------+
| | | | |
Tool Knowledge Findings PTT PoC
Registry Base DB Graph Generator
(173 tools) (NVD/GHSA (SQLite) (aiosqlite) (14 types)
+KEV/EPSS)
| |
Tool Executor Hallucination Guard
(async, sandboxed, (output verification)
destructive-gated)
|
Reporter
(md/html/json/sarif/h1/bugcrowd)
The orchestrator runs a bounded loop per phase:
plan(phase_context) -> execute(action) -> observe(result) -> update(state)
^ |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
until phase complete OR budget exceeded
Three independent budgets bound each phase: token budget, wall-clock time, and action count. Whichever trips first ends the phase and triggers finalize mode.
State is persisted to <engagement_dir>/state.json after every phase advance via atomic tmp + os.replace. Re-running aegis run against the same directory resumes at the last saved phase.
Reasoning engine
v0.12 repositions AEGIS from "tool dispatcher" to "brilliant bug-hunting partner". The agent reads observations, opens a structured theory, dispatches probes to test it, and writes a self-critique before advancing. The OOHA loop is the spine:
| Step | Meaning |
|---|---|
| OBSERVE | Read the new observations, the Open hypotheses block, and the Suggested-next block. What's actually new? |
| ORIENT | Where in the kill chain am I? What's the highest-impact primitive within reach? |
| HYPOTHESISE | Before dispatching a tool, propose_hypothesis with a one-paragraph rationale. If an open hypothesis matches, update_hypothesis with new evidence instead. |
| ACT | Dispatch run_tool / aegis_verify in batches — independent calls run in parallel. |
| CRITIQUE | Once per phase, self_critique — what assumption am I making that I haven't tested? Which open hypotheses are dead ends? |
Four reasoning verbs land in PLAN_TOOLS and bypass the per-phase enum filter (the agent reasons at every phase, not just VULN_ANALYSIS):
| Verb | Use |
|---|---|
propose_hypothesis(target, vuln_class, rationale) |
Open a structured theory before dispatching tools. Dedupes on (target, vuln_class) so repeated calls return the existing row. |
update_hypothesis(id, status, evidence_for, evidence_against) |
Append evidence; transitions to CONFIRMED auto-write a Finding (with severity inferred from vuln_class) so chain detection fires immediately. |
mark_dead_end(id, reason) |
Retire a theory permanently — keeps the suggester from re-surfacing it. The reason lands as evidence_against on the row. |
self_critique(reflection) |
Free-form reasoning persisted as a reasoning_trace audit event. The sanctioned "scratchpad" — no DB side-effect beyond the log. |
The Hypothesis lifecycle is PROPOSED → TESTING → CONFIRMED | REFUTED | DEAD_END. Open hypotheses are injected back into the observation summary every turn so the agent sees its own working theory across turns.
Parallel dispatch. Non-control tool calls in a single turn now run concurrently via asyncio.gather, capped by a per-runner semaphore (defaults to executor.max_parallel_tools, falls back to 4). Control verbs — advance_phase, change_phase, abort — stay serial so the orchestrator can short-circuit. One crashing dispatch never kills the rest of the batch.
Structured failure signals. _recent_calls was dict[(tool, target), int] carrying "failed N times". It's now dict[(tool, target), FailureSignal] with an 8-kind classifier (TIMEOUT, RATE_LIMITED, PERMISSION_DENIED, AUTH_REQUIRED, OUT_OF_SCOPE, BINARY_MISSING, ZERO_RESULTS, EXCEPTION) and an attacker-flavoured pivot hint per kind:
rate_limited→ useaegis_verifyin-process; it's not rate-limitedauth_required→ ingest the captured Burp/ZAP HAR with cookies viaaegis ingest har --replaybinary_missing→aegis env install --missing, oraegis_tool_list_help <category>for equivalents
The STUCK SIGNALS block in the observation summary renders kind + count + pivot, most-recent-first, capped at 5.
Attack chain detection
Findings carry structured tags. The chain detector matches on tag sets, not title substrings. 25 chains ship out of the box — 7 legacy web chains, 10 modern web/API chains, 5 Active Directory chains, and 3 v0.12 high-ROI gaps (host header, web cache deception, parameter pollution):
| Chain | Severity | Predicate (tag groups) |
|---|---|---|
| Account takeover via CORS + JWT | critical | cors_wildcard + jwt-family |
| Stored XSS + CSRF = session hijack | critical | xss_stored + csrf |
| SQL injection + weak crypto | critical | sqli + weak_crypto |
| SSRF + internal service exposure | high | ssrf + cloud/internal |
| SSRF + cloud metadata v1 | critical | ssrf + cloud_metadata_v1 |
| Mass assignment + admin endpoint | critical | mass_assignment + admin_endpoint |
| Open bucket + reachable Lambda | high | bucket_open + lambda_invoke |
| Request smuggling → auth header bypass | critical | request_smuggling + auth_header |
| Cache poisoning → auth bypass | critical | cache_poisoning + auth_cookie |
| Prototype pollution → RCE sink | critical | prototype_pollution + dangerous_sink |
| JWT alg-confusion → privilege escalation | critical | jwt_alg_confusion + privileged_endpoint |
Exposed .git → source code disclosure |
high | git_exposure |
| Open registration + IDOR | high | open_registration + idor |
| Race condition → auth bypass | high | race_condition + auth |
| Kerberoasting → service account compromise | high | ad_kerberoast + ad_spn + weak/service |
| AS-REP roasting | high | ad_no_preauth + weak/user |
| DCSync → full domain compromise | critical | ad_dcsync + any AD creds |
| AdminSDHolder ACL backdoor | critical | ad_adminsdholder + any AD creds |
| Unconstrained delegation → ticket forge | critical | ad_unconstrained + any AD creds |
| Host Header Injection → Cache Poisoning | critical | host_header_injection + cache_poisoning/redirect_open |
| Web Cache Deception → Auth Token Leak | high | web_cache_deception + auth_cookie/auth_header |
| HTTP Parameter Pollution → Auth Bypass | high | http_parameter_pollution + auth_bypass/idor/mass_assignment |
For engagements predating the tag rollout, a substring fallback still fires the legacy 7 rules against finding titles.
Guided hunting
Chains are post-hoc detection — they fire when findings are already in the DB. Playbooks are the proactive counterpart: 28 entries in src/aegis/analysis/vuln_playbooks.py say "when you suspect X, run these probes; when you confirm X, hunt Y next".
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
vuln_class |
one of the TAG_* constants from chains.py |
severity_floor |
critical / high / medium / low / info |
preconditions |
state predicates (has_params, has_login, has_jwt, …) |
probes |
concrete (tool_name, args_template, rationale) tuples |
confirm_chain |
the ChainRule.name this playbook ultimately feeds, if any |
follow_ups |
other vuln classes to hunt next when this one fires |
Initial set (one playbook per chain tag):
sqli, nosqli, cmdi, ssti, xxe, xss_stored, xss_reflected, ssrf, lfi, cloud_metadata_v1, bucket_open, request_smuggling, cache_poisoning, prototype_pollution, jwt_alg_confusion, jwt_weak_secret, csrf, idor, race_condition, mass_assignment, git_exposure, cors_wildcard, ad_kerberoast, ad_no_preauth, ad_dcsync, host_header_injection, web_cache_deception, http_parameter_pollution.
After every phase tick, EngagementRunner._suggested_next builds an escalation state from confirmed findings (tags + endpoints + tech stack) and runs adaptive.escalate. The top three actions are injected into the next observation summary as a Suggested next probes block; the model can act on them or ignore. Either way the recommendation is logged to audit_event with event_type='escalation_suggested' so aegis stats can answer "how often did the model take the suggestion?".
Tag inference (src/aegis/analysis/tag_inference.py) runs at the persistence boundary inside FindingsDB.add_finding. Findings get tags from a tool-base map (e.g. impacket_get_userspns → [ad_kerberoast, ad_spn]) plus a 31-rule substring matcher over the title + evidence text (distinguishing jwt_alg_confusion from jwt_weak_secret, xss_stored from xss_reflected, IMDSv1 in payloads tagging cloud_metadata_v1). Explicit tags from the caller are preserved.
Lateral pivots (v0.12). src/aegis/reasoning/lateral.py encodes the post-confirmation question every brilliant bug hunter asks: "given primitive X, what NEW classes does it unlock?" 10 hand-curated rows cover the highest-leverage chains — SSRF → IMDS → IAM → S3 → credential pivot; SQLi → file read via INTO OUTFILE → log poisoning → RCE; .git exposure → source review → JWT secret extraction → forge any token. Every confirmed primitive auto-proposes one hypothesis per unlocked class (proposed_by="lateral:<source_tag>") so the agent sees concrete next probes already framed as "given X, hunt Y because…".
Partial-chain primers (v0.12). Most chains need 2–3 required tag groups. When one group matches but at least one is missing, chains.partial_matches() returns the near-miss; the orchestrator surfaces them in the obs summary as PARTIAL CHAINS (one probe away) with what we have and what's missing — the agent sees concrete one-probe-away opportunities without an LLM planning call.
Token model
Aegis is designed to complete a full medium-scope engagement for under $2 in LLM tokens. This is achieved through several layered tactics:
| Tactic | Impact |
|---|---|
| Tiered model routing (Haiku handles ~70% of calls) | -60% cost |
| Prompt caching on system prompt + engagement context | -40% on input tokens |
| Parsed tool output, never raw stdout to the LLM | -80% on tool-heavy phases |
| Structured tool-use schema, no prose planning | -30% output tokens |
| Methodology-driven action space pruning | -50% wasted calls |
| SQLite-cached recon reused across phases | variable |
| Finding deduplication before LLM sees results | -10-30% |
Model tiers:
| Tier | Model | Used for |
|---|---|---|
| NANO | claude-haiku-4-5 | Parsing, classification, summarization |
| MAIN | claude-sonnet-4-6 | Planning, hypothesis generation, verification probes |
| DEEP | claude-opus-4-7 | Attack chain analysis, hard reasoning |
| LOCAL | ollama (optional) | Offline pre-classification |
The live cost meter runs in the terminal throughout each phase:
Phase: VULN_ANALYSIS [>>>>>>>>--] 80%
Budget: $0.74 / $5.00 Tokens: 41.2k / 200k Time: 12m / 60m
Tier breakdown: NANO 24% . MAIN 71% . DEEP 5% Cache hit: 82%
Tool catalog
Aegis exposes 173 MCP tools wrapping 105 external binaries plus orchestration primitives. Raw output is never passed to the LLM — each tool has a typed parser that produces structured Finding or Observation models. A nmap scan returning 47 open ports becomes 47 OpenPort observations of ~80 bytes each, not 200 KB of XML.
All tools degrade gracefully: if a binary is not installed, the tool returns a structured error with the exact install command.
| Category | Tools |
|---|---|
| API ingest | aegis ingest openapi, aegis ingest postman, aegis ingest har (writes Endpoint observations + paths.txt/params.txt wordlists) |
| Subdomain enumeration | subfinder, amass, assetfinder, findomain, dnsx, alterx, massdns, shuffledns, puredns, dnstwist, subdomain_brute_massive |
| DNS recon | dnsrecon, dnsx, massdns, fierce, crt.sh (cert transparency) |
| OSINT / passive | uncover (Shodan/Fofa/Censys/ZoomEye), shodan CLI, censys CLI, asnmap, passive_intel, github_discover, pwndb_search, theharvester, spiderfoot, recon_ng, google_dorks |
| Live host detection | httpx, httpx_batch, httprobe, naabu |
| Port scanning | nmap, naabu, masscan, rustscan |
| Web crawling | katana, gospider, hakrawler, getjs |
| URL / archive recon | gau, waybackurls, wayback_recon, meg, unfurl, qsreplace |
| Content discovery | ffuf, feroxbuster, gobuster, dirsearch, wfuzz, content_discovery, kiterunner |
| Vhost fuzzing | ffuf_vhost |
| Tech fingerprinting | whatweb, httpx -tech-detect, cdncheck, tlsx |
| WAF detection | wafw00f, whatwaf |
| TLS auditing | sslscan, sslyze, tlsx |
| Parameter discovery | arjun, paramspider, gf (pattern filtering) |
| XSS | dalfox, kxss, crlfuzz, xsstrike, nuclei, aegis_verify (xss probe) |
| SQLi | sqlmap*, nosqlmap*, nuclei, aegis_verify (sqli / timing_sqli probes) |
| SSTI | sstimap*, aegis_verify (ssti probe) |
| Command injection | commix*, aegis_verify (cmdi_oob probe) |
| HTTP smuggling | smuggler* (CL/TE, TE/CL), h2csmuggler (HTTP/2 cleartext) |
| CORS | corsy |
| SSRF / OOB | oob_init + oob_poll (interactsh), aegis_verify (ssrf_oob / xxe probes) |
| Race conditions | race_condition_scan, aegis_verify (race probe) |
| OAuth | oauth_audit (open redirect, state bypass, PKCE) |
| JWT attacks | jwt_audit (alg:none, RS256→HS256, weak secret) |
| GraphQL | graphql_audit (schema walk, batch DoS, deep nesting, per-query auth probe, rate-limit burst), graphql_cop |
| WebSocket | websocket_test (injection, origin validation, auth) |
| API discovery | api_discover, kiterunner, openapi_audit |
| IDOR | idor_check (cross-user object access) |
| JS analysis | js_recon, linkfinder, secretfinder |
| Header injection | header_injection_scan (Host header, cache poisoning) |
| 403 bypass | bypass_403 (path tricks + header overrides) |
| Prototype pollution | aegis_verify (prototype_pollution probe) |
| Secrets / SAST | trufflehog, semgrep, bandit, safety, npm_audit, retire_js, secret_scan |
| Vulnerability scanning | nuclei, nuclei_fuzz, nuclei_ai_generate, wapiti, nikto |
| CMS scanning | wpscan*, cmseek, joomscan, droopescan |
| Network / SMB | enum4linux, smbmap, snmpcheck |
| Active Directory | impacket (GetUserSPNs.py, GetNPUsers.py, secretsdump.py), kerbrute*, bloodhound-python, ldapdomaindump, crackmapexec*, certipy |
| Cloud config audit | scoutsuite (AWS/Azure/GCP/Aliyun/OCI), cloudsplaining, pmapper, iamspy, azurehound, roadtools, gcp-iam-collector, gcp-scanner |
| Cloud storage | cloud_enum, s3scanner, bucket_finder, gitdumper, cloudfox |
| Kubernetes | kube_bench, kube_hunter, kdigger, kubectl-who-can |
| Container / SBOM | trivy, grype, syft |
| Auth / brute force | hydra* |
| Subdomain takeover | subjack, subzy, subdomain_takeover_scan |
| Recon orchestration | bbot (multi-module OSINT), interlace (parallel execution) |
| Reporting | aegis_report (md / html / json / sarif / h1 / bugcrowd) |
| Methodology | wstg_check (OWASP WSTG v4.2, 80+ checks) |
| Attack graph (PTT) | ptt_add_node, ptt_update_node, ptt_get_graph, ptt_next_targets, ptt_spawn_tasks, ptt_summary |
| Orchestration | aegis_hotlist (asset risk scoring), aegis_compress_context (context compression), aegis_engagement_status |
| PoC generation | generate_poc (14 vuln classes: XSS, SQLi, SSRF, LFI, RCE, IDOR, open redirect, JWT, CORS, CSRF, HTTP smuggling, SSTI, XXE, prototype pollution) |
| Output verification | verify_tool_output (hallucination guard — validates tool output before Claude acts on it) |
| Modern JS surface | nextjs_data_probe, astro_endpoint_probe, source_map_extract, spa_route_discover |
| Synthesised nuclei templates | nuclei_synth_from_probe, nuclei_synth_list |
| Mobile + API extras | mobsf_static_scan, dredd_run, postman_runner |
| Tool documentation | aegis_tool_help, aegis_tool_list_help |
* marks tools that require operator approval before each run (destructive-gated).
Tool playbooks
165 per-tool markdown playbooks ship inside the wheel under aegis/_docs/tools/. The agent fetches them on demand instead of carrying full flag references in the system prompt every turn.
| MCP tool | Returns |
|---|---|
aegis_tool_help(name) |
full markdown body — Purpose, Args, Common flags, Pitfalls, When to use, Example — plus typo suggestions when the name doesn't match |
aegis_tool_list_help(category) |
one-line index across all docs; filter by category (network, vuln, ad, cloud, k8s, …) |
Every doc follows a fixed schema so the model can rely on the section ordering:
# tool_name
**Purpose:** one-sentence summary.
## Args
- arg (type): meaning
## Common flags worth knowing
- -X short note
## Pitfalls
- short bullet
## When to use
- which phase, what precondition triggers it
## Example
`tool_name(target="…", flags="…")`
The 11 hot-path tools have hand-curated playbooks; the rest are scaffolded by scripts/gen_tool_docs.py from the existing docstring + ToolSpec.install hint. Override or hand-edit anything under docs/tools/<category>/<name>.md — the on-disk source layout wins over the packaged copy during editable installs.
Verification probes
43 in-process probes (aegis.verify.probes) confirm findings without re-invoking external binaries. Each probe targets a specific class and emits a structured ProbeResult. Probes are HTTP-only by default and rate-limited per scope.
blind_cmdi, blind_cmdi_oob, blind_sqli, cache, cache_poisoning,
cmdi_oob, cors, cors_misconfig, csrf, csrf_missing, exposure,
file_exposure, headers, http_smuggling, jwt, jwt_alg_confusion,
lfi, misconfig, oauth, oauth_redirect, open_redirect, pp,
prototype_pollution, race, race_condition, redirect,
request_smuggling, smuggling, sqli, sqli_error, ssrf, ssrf_oob,
ssti, subdomain_takeover, takeover, template_injection,
timing_cmdi, timing_sqli, toctou, xml_injection, xss,
xss_reflected, xxe
Probes adopted three reliability upgrades in v0.12:
aegis.verify.baseline— differential request/response diffs (status, body hash, content-length above a 200-byte threshold, redirect Location). Kills the catch-all-200 false positive where a server returns identical HTML for every URL.aegis.verify.oob_waiter.confirm_oob— polls the OOB session until a callback matches the nonce (substring or regex) or the deadline hits. v0.11 sent the payload and returned immediately; this is the real confirmation seam for blind SSRF / CMDi / XXE.aegis.verify.mutations— per-probe-type WAF-evasion retries when a payload hits 403/406/419.sqli(double-URL-encode, backtick swap,/**/comment inject),xss(fullwidth unicode, mixed case),lfi(null-byte +.png/.jpgsuffix), plusssrf,ssti,cmdi,header_injection.
Reports and webhooks
Six output formats, all driven from the same Reporter context:
| Format | Use |
|---|---|
md / html |
human consumption |
json |
machine consumption with stable schema |
sarif |
GitHub Code Scanning, GitLab Security, Azure DevOps |
h1 |
HackerOne submission — one JSON per finding under reports/h1/ |
bugcrowd |
Bugcrowd VRT-mapped JSON bundle |
PII redaction is opt-in via [reporting] redact_pii = true. Sweeps emails, JWTs, AWS keys, GitHub PATs, Slack tokens, US SSNs, credit-card-shaped numbers, and phone numbers. IP redaction is a separate switch. Audit log records counts only — never content. Scope metadata (engagement_id, client) is intentionally preserved.
Live findings webhook via aegis watch:
aegis watch engagements/2026-acme \
--webhook https://hooks.slack.com/services/... \
--webhook-format slack \
--webhook-min-severity high
Supported platforms: slack (Block Kit), discord (severity-coloured embeds), linear (issue title/description/priority), json (stable schema for n8n / Zapier).
Environment profiling
On first run, aegis init profiles the host and derives auto-tuned concurrency settings:
Host: arch-workstation
OS Arch Linux (rolling, kernel 6.9.3-arch1-1)
CPU AMD Ryzen 7 5800X . 8 cores / 16 threads . 4.7 GHz
Memory 32 GB total . 24 GB available
Repos core, extra, multilib, blackarch
Pentest toolchain: 28/35 detected
nmap 7.95 nuclei 3.2.9 httpx 1.6.6
ffuf 2.1.0 subfinder 2.6.6 katana 1.1.0
sqlmap 1.8.5 wpscan 3.8.27 nikto 2.5.0
gobuster 3.6.0 amass 4.2.0 gowitness 3.0.3
Missing: testssl.sh feroxbuster dnsrecon arjun paramspider trufflehog
-> Run: aegis env install --missing
Auto-tuned concurrency:
nmap_parallelism=16 nuclei_concurrency=32 ffuf_threads=64
httpx_concurrency=80 max_parallel_tools=4
CLI reference
aegis init First-run setup and env profile
aegis env show Display host profile
aegis env tools Tool inventory
aegis env install --missing Generate install commands for missing tools
aegis env refresh Re-detect host profile
aegis kb sync [--source nvd|ghsa|nuclei|kev|epss] Sync knowledge base
aegis kb stats Knowledge base summary
aegis kb query --product nginx --min-cvss 7 Query CVEs
aegis engagement new --client X --domain Y Scaffold engagement dir and scope.yaml
aegis engagement list List engagements
aegis ingest openapi <spec> --engagement <dir> Seed endpoints from OpenAPI / Swagger
aegis ingest postman <coll> --engagement <dir> Seed endpoints from Postman v2.x
aegis ingest har <trace> --engagement <dir> [--replay] Seed endpoints from a browser HAR; --replay re-issues each request and diffs the response
aegis run <dir> [--phase PHASE] Run engagement (resumes from state.json)
aegis run <dir> --dry-run Preview planned actions
aegis run <dir> --budget-usd 2.00 Cap spend
aegis watch <dir> --webhook <url> Live findings webhook
--webhook-format slack|discord|linear|json
--webhook-min-severity critical|high|medium|low|info
aegis report <dir> [--format md|html|json|sarif|h1|bugcrowd|all] Generate report
aegis findings list <dir> [--severity high] List findings
aegis findings suppress <finding-id> --reason "..."
aegis cost <dir> Detailed cost breakdown
aegis audit <dir> Full audit log
aegis stats [<root>] [--json] Cross-engagement metrics
aegis shells Tool execution history (last scan)
aegis shells --all [--tool X] [--engagement Y] Cross-engagement shell history (SQLite)
aegis docker build|run|shell|pull|status Docker sub-app
All commands support --json for scripting, -v/-vv/-vvv for verbosity, --quiet for CI.
Configuration
Global config lives at ~/.config/aegis/config.toml. Any key can be overridden per engagement in engagement_dir/config.toml.
[api]
anthropic_api_key_env = "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"
[models]
nano = "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001"
main = "claude-sonnet-4-6"
deep = "claude-opus-4-7"
[models.local]
enabled = false
endpoint = "http://localhost:11434"
model = "qwen2.5:7b"
[budgets]
tokens_per_phase = 30000
tokens_per_engagement = 200000
usd_per_engagement = 5.00
wall_time_per_phase_sec = 1800
[caching]
prompt_cache = true
kb_cache_dir = "~/.cache/aegis/kb"
fingerprint_cache_ttl_hours = 168
[tooling]
docker_isolate = false
default_rate_limit_rps = 10
respect_robots_txt = false
[reporting]
default_format = "html"
include_audit_log = true
redact_pii = false
redact_ips = false
Tech stack
| Layer | Choice |
|---|---|
| Language | Python 3.12+ |
| CLI | Typer + Rich |
| TUI | React + Ink (TypeScript) |
| Async | asyncio + anyio |
| HTTP | httpx (async, HTTP/2) |
| Models | Pydantic v2 |
| Storage | SQLite + SQLModel + Alembic |
| MCP | FastMCP |
| LLM | Anthropic SDK (Claude) |
| Templating | Jinja2 |
| Logging | structlog + rich |
| Packaging | uv (dev), hatch (build) |
| Testing | pytest + pytest-asyncio + respx (494 tests) |
License
MIT. Use responsibly and only against systems you are authorized to test.
Built by Majd Bnat
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